This paper studies novel attack and defense strategies, based on a class of stealthy attacks, namely the zerodynamics attack (ZDA), for multi-agent control systems. ZDA poses a formidable security challenge since its attack signal is hidden in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it can evade conventional detection methods. An intuitive defense strategy builds on changing the aforementioned representation via switching through a set of carefully crafted topologies. In this paper, we propose realistic ZDA variations where the attacker is aware of this topologyswitching strategy, and hence employs the following policies to avoid detection: (i) "pause (update and resume) attack" before (after) topology switching to evade detection; (ii) cooperate with a concurrent stealthy topology attack that alters network topology at switching times, such that the original ZDA is feasible under the corrupted topology. We first systematically study the proposed ZDA variations, and then develop defense strategies against them under the realistic assumption that the defender has no knowledge of attack starting, pausing, and resuming times and the number of misbehaving agents. Particularly, we characterize conditions for detectability of the proposed ZDA variations, in terms of the network topologies to be maintained, the set of agents to be monitored, and the measurements of the monitored agents that should be extracted, while simultaneously preserving the privacy of the states of the non-monitored agents. We then propose an attack detection algorithm based on the Luenberger observer, using the characterized detectability conditions. We provide numerical simulation results to demonstrate our theoretical findings.
grids [16] . The "networked" aspect exacerbates the difficulty of securing these systems, since centralized measurement (sensing) and control are not feasible for such large-scale systems [17] , and hence require the development of decentralized approaches, which are inherently prone to attacks. Particularly, a special class of "stealthy" attacks, namely the "zero-dynamics attack" (ZDA), poses a significant security challenge [18] [19] [20] . The main idea behind ZDA is to hide the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system so that it cannot be detected by applying conventional detection methods on the observation signal (hence, the name "stealthy"). The objective of such an attack can vary from manipulating the controller to accept false data that would yield the system towards a desired (e.g., unstable) state to maliciously altering system dynamics (topology attack) to affect the system trajectory.
Recent research efforts have focused on variations of ZDA for systems with distinct properties. For stochastic cyberphysical systems, Park et al. [21] designed a robust ZDA, where the attack-detection signal is guaranteed to stay below a threshold over a finite horizon. In [22] , Kim et al. proposed a discretized ZDA for the sampled-data control systems, where the attack-detection signal is constantly zero at the sampling times. Another interesting line of research pertains to developing defense strategies [17] , [23] [24] [25] [26] . For example, Jafarnejadsani et al. [19] , [27] proposed a multi-rate L 1 adaptive controller that can detect ZDA in the sampled-data control systems by removing certain unstable zeros of discretetime systems [18] , [20] . Back et al. [28] used "generalized hold" to render the impact of bounded ZDA.
Most of the prior work on defense strategies for the original ZDA builds on rather restrictive assumptions regarding the connectivity of network topology and the number of the misbehaving agents (i.e., the agents under attack) [17] , [23] [24] [25] . For example, the detection approach in [26] works only for the scenario of single misbehaving agent in second-order systems, while it requires the number of input-output linking to be larger than the number of misbehaving agents in more general multi-agent systems [17] . Teixeira et al. [29] showed that the strategic changes in system dynamics could be used by defender to detect ZDA, but it requires the attack-starting times to be the initial time and known to defender. In other words, the defense strategy fails to work if the attack-starting time is designed to be not the initial time and the defender has no such knowledge, as is practically the case for most scenarios.
As a first step towards a practical ZDA defense strategy, in [30] , [31] , strategic topology switching is proposed. This strategy is motivated by the feasibility of controlling communication topology driven due to recent developments in mobile computing, wireless communication and sensing [32] , [33] . We note, in passing, that the idea of using the changes in the state-space dynamics to detect ZDA first appeared in [34] , albeit a realistic mechanism (e.g., switching the system topology) to achieve that objective was only very recently studied in [30] , [31] . However, the defense strategy in [30] , [31] still relies on a naive attacker that does not take the topology switching strategy of the defender into account.
In this paper, we systematically address this practically important problem: what kind of ZDA strategies can an informed attacker design against a topology-switching system and what are the optimal defense strategies, beyond switching the topology, against such intelligent attacks? We note that we study these questions under realistic assumptions on the capabilities of the defender, i.e., we assume that the defender does not know the start, pause and resume times of the attack or the number of misbehaving agents. We also assume that the attacker is aware of the strategic changes in system dynamics. Moreover, we assume that the defender has to preserve the privacy of the outputs of the non-monitored agents, i.e., the outputs should be unobservable, since it is assumed that the attacker has access to the output signal. The following example from coordination control illustrates our motivation to impose this privacy constraint.
For the coordination control of multi-agent systems, see e.g., the connected autonomous vehicles, the data of initial positions and velocities can be used by the adversary to estimate target location [35] , and the individual initial positions include individual home-base locations. Once the attacker has access to the outputs of monitored agents and the system is observable, the attacker can use current available data to infer the global initial condition and global real-time system state. From a perspective of stealthy topology attack design (e.g., topology attack in smart grids [36] and software-defined networks [37] ), the attacker needs (estimated) real-time data of some agents' state to decide the target connection links to attack. Unfortunately, the inferred global real-time system state implies the largest scope of attackable connection links exposed to the attacker. To reduce the feasible area of target links for the cooperative ZDA (i.e., a ZDA variant proposed in this paper which refers to ZDA in cooperation with a stealthy topology attack), monitored outputs have to be constrained to be unobservable to preserve the privacy of non-monitored agents' real-time states, consequently the global system state and global initial condition.
Throughout this paper, we focus on the following policies which can be used by the attacker to evade detection: 1) intermittently pause, update and resume ZDA according to the knowledge of the sequence of topologies (intermittent ZDA). 2) cooperatively work with a stealthy topology attack, such that the original ZDA policy continues to be feasible under the corrupted topology (cooperative ZDA). In [1] , we present our preliminary results on the conditions for detectability of an intermittent ZDA. In this paper, building on [1] , we develop integrated defense strategies for both intermittent and cooperative ZDA variants, in the presence of privacy considerations. More specifically, we develop defense strategies to address the following questions: what network topology should be maintained, which agents should be monitored and what measurements the monitored agents should output, such that the intermittent and cooperative ZDA variants are detectable, and at the same time, the privacy of nonmonitored agents' real-time states are preserved? Based on the answers of the questions above, we next propose a strategic topology-switching algorithm to detect the ZDA variants without requiring information on the number of misbehaving agents or the start, pause, and resume times of the ZDA. This paper is organized as follows. We present the preliminaries and the problem formulation in Sections II and III, respectively. In Section IV, we analyze the proposed ZDA variants. In Section V, we characterize the conditions for detectability of these ZDA variants. Based on this characterization, we develop an attack detection algorithm in Section VI. Numerical simulation results are provided in Section VII, and the concluding remarks and the future research directions are discussed in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
R n and R m×n denote the set of n-dimensional real vectors and the set of m × n-dimensional real matrices, respectively. Let C denote the set of complex numbers. N represents the set of the natural numbers and N 0 = N ∪ {0}. Let 1 n×n and 0 n×n be the n × n-dimensional identity matrix and zero matrix, respectively. 1 n ∈ R n and 0 n ∈ R n denote the vector with all ones and the vector with all zeros, respectively. The superscript '⊤' stands for matrix transpose. µ P (A) denotes the induced P -norm matrix measure of A ∈ R n×n , with P > 0, i.e., µ P (A) =
{y : Ay ∈ F}. Also, |·| denotes the cardinality of a set, or the modulus of a number. V\K describes the complement set of K with respect to V.
, and [W ] a:b,c:d denote the k th power of W , the element in row i and column j, the b th row, and the sub-matrix formed by the entries in the a th through b th row and the c th through d th column of W , respectively.
The interaction among n agents is modeled by an undirected graph G (V, E), where V {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of vertices that represents n agents and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges of the graph G. The weighted adjacency matrix A = [a ij ] ∈ R n×n of the graph G is defined as a ij = a ji > 0 if (i, j) ∈ E, and a ij = a ji = 0 otherwise. Assume that there are no self-loops, i.e., for any i ∈ V, a ii = 0. The Laplacian matrix of graph G is defined as
a ij , and l ij −a ij for i = j. The diameter m of a graph is the longest shortest unweighted path between any two vertices in the graph.
B. Definitions
A second-order system consists of a population of n agents whose dynamics are governed by the following equations:
The broad applications of its coordination control is the main motivation of this paper considering the model (1) . For coordination control, we consider more representative average consensus. We recall the definitions of consensus and ZDA to review the control objective and the attack policy.
Definition 1: [44] The agents in the system (1) are said to achieve the asymptotic consensus with final zero common velocity if for any initial condition:
Definition 2: [45] Consider the system in the presence of attack signalg(t):ż
wherez (t) ∈ Rn,y (t) ∈ Rm,g(t) ∈ Rō, A ∈ Rn ×n , B ∈ Rn ×ō , C ∈ Rm ×n , and D ∈ Rm ×ō . The attack signalg(t) = ge ηt is a zero-dynamics attack if there exist a scalar η ∈ C, and nonzero vectors z 0 and g ∈ Rō, that satisfy
Moreover, the states and observed outputs of system (7) satisfy
where y (t) and z (t) are the output and state of the system (7) in the absence of attacks, i.e., the dynamics:
(7b)
C. Control Protocol
We borrow a control protocol that involves topology switching from [44] , [46] to achieve the consensus (2) for the agents in system (1):
. . , s}, is the switching signal of the interaction topology of the communication network; a σ(t) ij is the entry of the weighted adjacency matrix that describes the activated topology of communication graph.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We let K ⊆ V denote the set of misbehaving agents, i.e., the agents whose local control inputs are under attack. For simplicity, we let the increasingly ordered set M {1, 2, . . .} ⊆ V denote the set of monitored agents. Since the outputs of monitored agents in M are used for attack detection, M is referred to as the set of detectors as well.
In this paper, we make the following assumptions on the attacker and defender.
Assumption 1: The attacker
• is aware that the changes in system dynamics are used by the defender (system operator); • knows output matrix, initial topology and switching times before the first topology switching; • needs a non-negligible time to compute and update attack policy and identify newly activated topology; • can record the newly obtained knowledge of network topology into his memory; • knows the outputs of monitored agents in M, while does not know the measurements of other agents in V/M. Assumption 2: The defender • designs the switching times (when to switch) and switching topologies (what topology to switch to); • chooses candidate agents to monitor, i.e., the monitored agent set M, for attack detection; • knows that the states of systems in the absence of attacks are continuous with respect to time, i.e.,
; • has no knowledge of the start, pause and resume times, and the misbehaving agents. Remark 1: ZDA policy (4) shows that the attacker does not require the real-time outputs of monitored agents to obtain a feasible attack strategy consisting of the false data z 0 , and the parameters g and η of attack signalg(t). However, when ZDA seeks cooperation with a stealthy topology attack in response to strategic topology switching defense, then it needs the realtime outputs to identify the target links to attack.
A. Topology Switching Strategy
The building block of our defense strategy for security is periodic topology switching, i.e., there exists a period τ such that
Remark 2: We note that periodic switching does not depend on system state, i.e., switching times are independent of the state. This is because that the attack signals injected into control input may generate a Zeno behavior [47] , [48] , such that the control protocol (8) becomes infeasible under a state-dependent switching. Also, if the topology switching is random, the defender needs to often send the generated "random" information of network topology to the detector/estimator/observer in the cyber layer as well, which will be subject to a cyber topology attack (incorrect information of network topology is transmitted) [36] , [37] , [49] . To avoid this type of cyber attack, the defender chooses here periodic topology switching, and preprogram the (repeated) periodic switching sequence into the controlled links, and hence avoids sending the topology information to the cyber layer during the system operation.
For our defense strategy based on the periodic topology switching (9), we define the following periodic sequence with length of L:
where τ k denotes the dwell time of the activated topology indexed by σ(t k−1 ), i.e., τ k = t k − t k−1 .
Next, we study whether the agents in the system (1) using control input (8) can reach consensus under periodic topology switching. We first recall the well-known property of Laplacian matrix L r of a connected undirected graph from [50] :
based on which, we define:
Proposition 1: Consider the second-order multi-agent system (1) with control input (8) . If the switching topologies in L (10) include one connected topology indexed by r ∈ S, there always exists a periodic topology sequence (10) that satisfies
where ν s = τs τ with τ = L i=1 τ i . Moreover, under the periodic topology switching the consensus (2) can be achieved.
Proof: See Appendix B. Remark 3: Proposition 1 implies that for any coupling weights, there exists a feasible periodic topology switching sequence for consensus. This is in sharp contrast with arbitrary switching which limits magnitudes of coupling weights in order to guarantee consensus [46] .
B. System Description
Under periodic topology switching, the multi-agent system in (1), with the control input given by (8) and the outputs of monitored agents in M subject to the attack signalg i (t), can be written aṡ
where c i1 's and c i2 's are constant coefficients designed by the defender (system operator), while d i 's are coefficients designed by the attacker.
Remark 4: The model in (14b) implies that there are two practical approaches to attack the local control inputs: (i) the attacker directly inject the attack signal to the control architectures of misbehaving agents (target agents) in K; (ii) the attacker injects attack signals to the data sent to controller through breaking the encryption algorithm that protects the communication channels with misbehaving agents.
The system in (14) can be equivalently expressed as a switched system under attack:
wherȇ
In addition, we consider the system (15) in the absence of attacks, which is given bẏ
(17b)
C. Privacy of Initial Condition and Global System State
For secure multi-agent systems, see e.g., connected autonomous vehicles, the initial conditions should be kept confidential from an adversary since the individual initial positions contain the information of home-base locations, and data of initial positions and velocities can be used by the adversary to estimate the target locations [35] . The following two examples illustrate that the global initial condition as well as the global system state play an important role in stealthy attacks.
Example 1 (Attack Objective): The state solution under attack (6) implies that if η = 0, attacker's objective is to modify the steady-state value. If the attack objective is to modify the target location to a new location that the attacker desires, the attacker must know the original target location in the absence of attacks. Under undirected communication, it is straightforward to verify from the system (1) with its control input (8) that 1 |V| i∈Vv
implies that the average positionx(t)
which indicates that when the consensus is achieved, all of the individual agents synchronize to the target location:
Unfortunately (18) shows that the original target location can simply be computed through a simple mean computation, once the global initial condition is known (i.e., initial positions and velocities of all agents). Example 2 (Stealthy Topology Attack Design): Stealthy topology attack design, as in smart grids [36] and power networks [49] , requires (estimated) real-time data of system states to choose the target connection links to attack, such that the system dynamics could be maliciously altered to achieve the attack objective. Once the attacker can record the newly obtained knowledge of the network topology, she has the memory of the past topologies of the switching sequence. Whenever the data on the global initial condition z (t 0 ) (or real-time global state z (t)) is available, the attacker can infer the exact real-time global state z (t) (or global initial condition z (t 0 )) through
which would be used whenever ZDA seeks cooperation with stealthy topology attack to evade detection. Therefore, the private global initial condition or system state can reduce the scope of target links for stealthy topology attack. We now impose the following unobservability condition on the monitored outputs to preserve the privacy of nonmonitored agents, such that the attacker cannot use the available (monitored) outputs to infer any non-monitored agent's full state (and consequently, the global system state and initial condition).
Lemma 1: For the system (17), x i (t) and v i (t), ∀i ∈ V\M, are not simultaneously observable for any t ∈ [t 0 , t + m ), if and only if
where
Proof: The condition in (19) implies that N m 1 = 0 2|V| . Using Theorem 1 in [51] , it follows that the system in (17) is unobservable for any t ∈ [t 0 , t + m ). Also, (19) implies that p i = 0, and (or) p i+|V| = 0, and therefore the agent i's position and (or) velocity are (is) not partially observable.
Remark 5: Although the selection of the monitored output coefficients in (14c) subject to (19) renders the system (14) unobservable to preserve privacy, we will show that the proposed ZDA variations become detectable using the outputs y i (t)'s by careful selection of switching topologies and the set of monitored agents.
IV. STEALTHY ATTACK MODEL
In the scenario where the attacker is aware of the detection purpose of strategic changes in system dynamics induced by topology switching [30] , [31] , the attacker can easily evolve his attack policies in response to the strategic changes at switching times to stay stealthy:
• "pause attack" before topology switching when the incoming topology is unknown or the attack policy (4) is infeasible under the known incoming topology, and "resume attack" after the feasibility of (updated) attack policy under newly activated topology is verified; • cooperate with a topology attack that can maliciously alter network topology at switching times, such that the original attack policy (4) continues to be feasible under the corrupted topology.
In the following subsections, we give a systematic study on these ZDA variations.
A. Intermittent Zero-Dynamics Attack
For convenience, we refer to T as the set of topologies under which the attacker injects attack signals to control inputs, and we refer to ξ k and ζ k as the attack-resuming and attackpausing times over the active topology intervals [t k , t k+1 ), k ∈ N 0 , respectively.
The ZDA signals injected into the control input and monitored output of system (14) with intermittent pausing and resuming behavior are described as
To analyze this ZDA, we review the monitored output (14c) at the first "pausing" time ζ 0 :
Meanwhile, the defender knows that the velocity and position states are always continuous with respect to time, and hence the monitored outputs must be continuous as well. Therefore, to avoid the "jump" on monitored outputs to maintain the stealthy property (5), the attacker cannot completely pause the attack, i.e., whenever the attacker pauses injecting ZDA signals to control inputs at pausing time ζ k , she must continue to inject the same attack signals to monitored outputs (14c):
or equivalently,
Based on the above analysis, for ZDA policy consisting of "pause attack" and "resume attack" behaviors to remain stealthy, it should satisfy (25) and
and O r is defined in (22) . Proposition 2: Under the stealthy attack policy consisting of (25) and (26), the states and monitored outputs of the system (17) and the (15) in the presence of attack signal (23) satisfyy
Proof: See Appendix C. Remark 6: At first glance it might seem that the intermittent ZDA is an asynchronous attack response to the strategic topology switching, since the attacker knows only the initial topology, and needs time to compute updated attack policy and identify the newly activated network topology and the target agents to attack. We note however that the attacker can record the newly obtained knowledge of network topology into her memory. Since the defender switches topologies periodically, if the recorded length of topology sequence is sufficiently long, the attacker can learn from her memory the (recurring) periodic sequence, i.e., the attacker knows all future switching topologies and times. The corresponding future synchronous attack policies can be obtained offline. Therefore, a synchronous attack response is possible only after the attacker obtains the (recurring) periodic topology sequence from her memory.
B. Cooperative Zero-Dynamics Attack
The objective of cooperation with stealthy topology attack is to make the ZDA policy (4) continue to hold under the corrupted topology. Unlike the class of false data injection attacks (e.g., replay attack, ZDA), the topology attack changes the dynamics of networked systems. Stealthy topology attack can be of two types:
• Physical Topology Attack: the attacker maliciously alters the the status of target connection links of physical systems, e.g., the bus interaction breaks in power networks [49] and link fabrication in software-defined networks [37] ; • Cyber Topology Attack: the attacker maliciously alters the information of network topology sent to the estimator/observer/detector [36] , [52] . As stated in Subsection III-A, the basis of our defense strategy is the periodic topology switching, and the defender (system) would preprogram the repeated switching times and topologies into the controlled links of the real system and observer/detector. In this case, the operator of real system does not need to send the information of topology to the observer/detector when the system operates. Therefore, the system under our defense strategy is not subject to cyber topology attack, and it is subject to physical topology attack.
We let t k+1 denote the switching time when ZDA cooperates with topology attack. The multi-agent system (15) in the presence of such cooperative attacks is described bẏ
where A σ(t) is the system matrix under the physically corrupted topology defined as
with L σ(t k+1 ) denoting the Laplacian matrix of the corrupted topology. We describe its corresponding system in the absence of ZDA, i.e., in the presence of the only physical topology attack, as˙
Ifg (t) is a ZDA signal in systems (15) and (36) at times t − k+1 and t k+1 , respectively, by (6), we havez
Here, we conclude that
otherwise, the system statez (t k+1 ) has "jump" behavior, which contradicts with the fact thatz(·) is continuous. The equation (39) and the stealthy property (5) imply that Cz (t k+1 ) = Cz (t k+1 ) = C z (t k+1 ), based on which, a necessary condition for the existence of ZDA under corrupted topology is stated formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Consider the systems in (38) and (17) . We have y (t) = y (t) for any t ∈ [t k+1 , t k+2 ), if and only if
Proof: See Appendix D.
We set d = 0, 1 and expand (40) out to obtain
The result (41) shows that like the stealthy topology attacks in smart grids [36] , [52] and software-defined networks [37] , the attacker needs some agents' real-time state data to decide the target links to attack, while the imposed condition (19) implies that the attacker cannot simultaneously infer x i (t k+1 ) and v i (t k+1 ), ∀i ∈ V\M, according to Lemma 1. Therefore, there should be a scope of target connection links. Without loss of generality, we express the difference of Laplacian matrices in the form:
where D denotes the set of agents in the sub-graph formed by the target links to be possibly attacked, L σ(t k+1 ) ∈ R |D|×|D| is the elementary row transformation of the Laplacian matrix of a subgraph G of the difference graph generated by the corrupted graph G t k+1 of the attack topology and candidate graph G t k+1 of the defender at time t k+1 . We should note here that the subgraph G is not necessarily connected.
Since C 2 ∈ R |M|×|V| and L σ(t k+1 ) ∈ R |D|×|D| , the relations in (19) , (41) , and (42) imply that the attacker can devise a stealthy topology attack (without knowing the measurements of the agents in V\M which are unavailable) only when the scope of target links satisfies:
V. DETECTABILITY OF STEALTHY ATTACKS Based on the systematic study of the attack behaviors in Section IV, in this section, we investigate the detectability of the proposed ZDA variants.
A. Detectability of Intermittent ZDA
We first define
where Q r satisfies (11) .
Strategy on Switching Topologies: L r has distinct eigenvalues for ∀r ∈ L.
Strategy on Monitored-Agent Locations : F = ∅.
Defense Strategy Against Intermittent ZDA
Theorem 1: Consider the system (14) in the presence of attack signals (23) . Under the defense strategy against intermittent ZDA,
• if the monitored agents output the full observations of their velocities (i.e., c i1 = 0 and c i2 = 0 for ∀i ∈ M), the intermittent zero-dynamics attack is detectable and
• if the monitored agents output the full observations of their positions (i.e., c i1 = 0 and c i2 = 0 for ∀i ∈ M), the intermittent zero-dynamics attack is detectable but
• if the monitored agents output the partial observations (i.e., c i1 = 0 and c i2 = 0 for ∀i ∈ M), and c i1 = c i2 , ∀i ∈ M, the kernel of the observability matrix satisfies
and the intermittent ZDA is detectable if
where N ∞ 1 is computed recursively by (20) and (21) .
Under the defense strategy consisting of (46) and (47), the result (49) means if the monitored agents output full observations of position, the system (17) is observable at any time t > t 0 . As a result, using the available data (5), the attacker can infer the global system state and the global initial condition. While the results (48) and (50) show that if the monitored agents output full observations of velocity or partial observations, the condition (19) of Lemma 1 is satisfied, and thus, the privacy of full states of non-monitored agents are preserved. Therefore, for the purpose of privacy preserving of non-monitored agents' states, consequently, restricting the scope of target links of stealthy topology attack, the defender (system operator) has to abandon full observation of position. Therefore, we only consider the full observation of velocity or the partial observation in deriving the defense strategies against the cooperative ZDA.
B. Detectability of Cooperative ZDA
Considering the matrix Q r satisfying (11), we describe the defense strategy as follows:
Strategy on Switching Topologies: (46) Strategy on Monitored Agents: c i2 > 0, ∀i ∈ M,
Theorem 2: Consider the system (36) in the presence of zero-dynamics attack in cooperation with topology attack under (43) . Under the defense strategy given by (46) , (52) and (53) , the cooperative ZDA is detectable when the system in the absence of attacks operates with non-identical initial conditions.
Proof: See Appendix F. Remark 7: Theorem 2 implies that the cooperative ZDA is undetectable only in the case of identical initial conditions, i.e., x i (t 0 ) = x j (t 0 ) and v i (t 0 ) = v j (t 0 ), ∀i = j ∈ V, In this case, the operating multi-agent system (17a) with (16b) degenerates to a single systemẍ i (t) = −v i (t), ∀i ∈ V, which is an unrealistic scenario, especially, in large-scale networked systems.
Remark 8:
The common critical requirement of our defense strategies is that the undirected communication network has distinct Laplacian eigenvalues. There indeed exist many topologies whose associated Laplacian matrices have distinct eigenvalues. The following lemma provides a guide to design such topologies:
Lemma 2 (Proposition 1.3.3 in [50] ): Let G be a connected graph with diameter m. Then, G has at least m + 1 distinct Laplace eigenvalues.
VI. ATTACK DETECTION ALGORITHM
Using the proposed defense strategies and the detectability condition in Section V, this section focuses on the attack detection algorithm that is based on a Luenberger observer.
A. Luenberger Observer under Switching Topology
We now present a Luenberger observer [53] :
wherey i (t) is the monitored output of agent i in system (14), r i (t) is the attack-detection signal. We also have q(t 0 ) = x(t 0 ) + f and w(t 0 ) =v(t 0 ) + f , which implies that the data of initial condition sent to the observer is subject to attack ( f and f are injecting false data) as well. We next consider a system matrix related to the system (54) in the absence of attacks:
with C 1 and C 2 given by (16d). It is straightforward to obtain the following result regarding the matrix stability. Lemma 3: The matrix A r defined by (55) is Hurwitz, if L r is the Laplacian matrix of a connected graph and
For the periodic switching sequence (10), if the switching topology has one connected graph and gain matrix C (56) satisfies (57), it follows from Lemma 3 that there exists a P > 0, such that under convex linear combination the matrix measure satisfies L s=1 ν s µ P A s < 0.
(58)
Algorithm 1: Strategic Topology Switching Input: Initial index k = 0, initial time t k = 0, observer gains satisfying (57), periodic sequence L (10) with length of L satisfying (13) and (58). 1 Run the system (14) and the observer (54); 2 Update dwell time: τ σ(t k ) ← τ σ(t mod (k,L+1)) ; 3 Update topologies of system (14) and observer (54):
at switching time t k + τ σ(t k ) ; 4 Update topology-switching time: t k ← t k + τ σ(t k ) ; 5 Update iteration index: k ← k + 1; 6 Go to Step 2.
B. Strategic Topology-Switching Algorithm
We next propose a strategic topology switching algorithm (Algorithm 1).
Theorem 3: If the monitored agents satisfy (47), (52) and (53), and the switching topologies in L satisfy (46),
• without requiring the knowledge of the misbehaving agents and the start, pause, and resume times of the attack, 1) with c i1 = 0, ∀i ∈ M, the observer (54) is able to detect the intermittent and cooperative ZDAs; 2) with c i1 = c i2 , ∀i ∈ M, the observer (54) is able to detect the cooperative ZDA and intermittent ZDA under (51);
• in the absence of attacks, the agents in system (14) achieve the asymptotic consensus, and the observer (54) asymptotically tracks the real system (15) if c i1 = c i2 , ∀i ∈ M, or c i1 = 0 and p i (t 0 ) − x i (t 0 ) = 0, ∀i ∈ M.
Proof: See Appendix G.
VII. SIMULATION We consider a system with n = 16 agents. The initial position and velocity conditions are chosen randomly as x(t 0 ) = [ 1 and 4 where the agents 1, 2 and 3 are the monitored agents.
A. Detection of Intermittent ZDA
We first consider the periodic topology switching sequence:
It can be shown that neither Topology 1 nor 2 in Figure 1 satisfies the defense strategy consisting of (46) and (47) . Therefore, the attacker can design an undetectable intermittent ZDA under the provided periodic topology switching sequence:
• inject false data z(t 0 ) = [0, 0, 0, −1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, −0.8, 0.8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] ⊤ to the data of initial condition sent to observer (54); The trajectories of some agents' positions and the attackdetection signals in Figure 2 show that the designed intermittent ZDA is not detected by the observer (54) under Algorithm 1, and the stealthy attack renders the system unstable. It is straightforward to show that Topology 3 and Topology 4 in Figure 1 satisfy the defense strategy consisting of (46) and (47) . Hence, we can turn to the following periodic topology switching sequence at some time to detect the stealthy attack:
Under the periodic sequence, the trajectories of attackdetection signals in Figure 3 show that the observer (54) succeeds in detecting the intermittent ZDA. One can easily verify that neither Topology 5 nor Topology 6 in Figure 4 satisfies the defense strategy consisting of (46), (52) and (53) . Therefore, it is possible that the attacker evades detection if the periodic topology switching sequence is
B. Detection of Cooperative ZDA
The stealthy cooperative ZDA is designed as follows:
• inject false data z(t 0 ) = [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] ⊤ to the data of initial condition sent to observer (54); • inject ZDA signalsg 1 (t) =g 3 (t) =g 7 (t) = −e t , g 4 (t) = 5e t ,g 5 (t) = 2e t andg 6 (t) = 3e t to the local control inputs of agents 1, 3, 7, 4, 5 and 6, respectively, at initial time; • inject false data −e t to the monitored outputs;
• maliciously modify the incoming Topology 6 to the corrupted Topology 7 in Figure 4 at incoming switching time that indicates the incoming Topology 7 is unknown. The trajectories of positions and attack-detection signals in Figure 5 show that the designed attack makes system unstable without being detected. It as well verifies that Topology 7 and Topology 8 in Figure 4 satisfy the defense strategy consisting of (46), (52) and (53) . Therefore, to detect the cooperative ZDA, we consider the following periodic topology switching sequence:
We let the topology attacker modify Topology 9 to corrupted Topology 10 in Figure 4 , or any other one under its scope of target links. The trajectories of attack-detection signals in Figure 6 demonstrate that the observer (54) under Algorithm 1 succeeds in detecting the cooperative ZDA. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have first introduced two ZDA variants for a scenario where the attacker is informed about the switching strategy of the defender: intermittent ZDA where the attacker pauses, and updates and resumes ZDA in conjunction with the knowledge of switching topology and dwell times, and cooperative ZDA where the attacker employs a stealthy topology attack to render the switching topology defense ineffective. We have then studied conditions for a defender to detect these attacks, and subsequently based on these conditions, we have proposed an attack detection algorithm. The proposed defense strategy can detect both of the proposed ZDA variations, without requiring any knowledge of the set of misbehaving agents or the start, pause and resume times of the attack. Moreover, this strategy achieves asymptotic consensus and tracking in the absence of an attack without limiting the magnitudes of the coupling weights or the number of monitored agents.
Our analysis suggests an interesting trade-off among the switching cost, the duration of an undetected attack, the convergence speed to consensus and tracking. Analyzing this fundamental trade-off through the lens of game theory and multi-objective optimization constitutes a part of our future research.
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APPENDIX A AUXILIARY LEMMAS
In this section, we present auxiliary lemmas that are used in the proofs of the main results of this paper.
Lemma 4: [54] Consider the switched systems:
under periodic switching, i.e., σ (t) = σ (t + τ ) ∈ S. If there exists a convex combination of some matrix measure that satisfies
where ν s = τs 
a 2 · · · a n a 2 1 a 2 2 · · · a 2 n . . . . . . · · · . . . a n−1 1 a n−1 2 · · · a n−1
Its determinant is det (H) = (−1) n 2 −n 2 i<j (a i − a j ).
Lemma 6:
Consider the matrix Q r that satisfies (11) . If λ 2 (L r ) > 0, then
Proof: The proof follows from a contradiction argument. We assume that (60) does not hold, i.e., there exists a vector ψ = [ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ |V| ] ⊤ such that
and Q ⊤ r 2:|V|,: ψ = 0 |V|−1 . Then, it follows from (11) that
From [50] , we know that an undirected graph is connected if and only if λ 2 (L r ) > 0, and further the null space of the Laplacian matrix L r of a connected graph is spanned by the vector 1 |V| . We obtain from (62) that ϕ 1 = . . . = ϕ |V| , which contradicts with (61). Thus, (60) holds. This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Based on average variablesx(t)
, we define the following fluctuation terms:
which verifies that
The dynamics of the second-order multi-agent system (1) with control input (8) can now be expressed equivalently aṡ
Let us definex Q ⊤ rx andv Q ⊤ rṽ . Noting (11) , the dynamics (65) can equivalently transform tȯ
where Υ rs is defined in (12a). We note that it follows from (64) and (11b) thatx 1 (t) =v 1 (t) = 0, [Υ rs ] 1,: = 0 ⊤ |V| and [Υ rs ] :,1 = 0 |V| . Let us define θ x 2 . . .x |V|v2 . . .v |V| ⊤ . Thus, the system (66) equivalently reduces tȯ
with A s given in (12b). Meanwhile, it is straightforward to verify that when r = s, A s is Hurwitz. Therefore, the exists a P > 0 such that µ P (A r ) < 0. Through setting on the dwell time of the topology indexed by r, (59) can be satisfied. By Lemma 4, the system (91) is uniformly asymptotically stable, i.e., for any initial condition, lim t→∞ θ (t) = 0 2|V|−2 , which means that lim
Since Q is full-rank, we have lim t→∞x (t) = lim t→∞ṽ (t) = 0 |V| . Then, (63) implies that lim t→∞x i (t) = lim t→∞x j (t) and lim t→∞ṽ i (t) = lim t→∞ṽ j (t) , ∀i = j ∈ V. Here, we can conclude that second-order consensus is achieved, and we can define v * = lim t→∞ṽ i (t) , ∀i ∈ V. Then, substituting the second-order consensus into the system (1) with control input (8) yields the dynamicsv * = −v * , which implies a common zero velocity. Thus, the proof is complete.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let us first define:
It is straightforward to obtain dynamics from (3) and (7) aṡ
where z (t) is defined in (33) .
A. Proof of (35)
Since
where L(·) stands for the Laplace transform operator. It follows from the attack signal (23) that
Without loss of generality, we let σ(t) = r for t ∈ [t k , t k+1 ). Then, the Laplace transform of the dynamics in (69) is obtained as
which is equivalent to
Expanding (26b) out yields
Substituting (73) 
B. Proof of (5)
It follows from (35) and (69) that
which combined with (72) results in y (t) = 0 |M| , or equivalently,y (t) = y (t), for any t ∈ [ξ k , ζ k ).
We next prove (5) over non-attack interval of ZDA [ζ k , ξ k+1 ). From (23) and (25), the dynamics (69) over such non-attack intervals of ZDA (subject to the monitored output attack as (25) ) is described bẏ
It follows from (35) and (75a) that
For D = 0 |M|×2|V| , we note that (34) means that the system (75) is unobservable for any t ∈ [t 0 , t k+1 ), ∀k ∈ N 0 . Considering (76) and following the same proof of Theorem 1 of [51] , we conclude that (34) holds if and only if
where N k 1 is computed by (27) and (28) . For D = 0 |M|×2|V| , it follows from (72) and (75b) that y (ζ k ) = y ζ − k = 0 |M| . Considering (76) and following the same proof of Theorem 1 of [51] , we conclude that (34) holds if and only if
where N k 1 is computed by (29) and (30) . In addition to (77) and (78), we conclude that if (26a) is satisfied, regardless of D k m=0g (ζ − m ) = 0 |M| or = 0 |M| , (34) always holds.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 Let us defineẽ(t)
ẽ ⊤
. Without loss of generality, we let σ(t k+1 ) = s. Noticing (39), we obtain from the dynamics (38) and (17) thaṫ
from which we have
and the corresponding derivatives
We note that under corrupted topology, the stealthy property y (t) − y (t) = 0 |M| for any t ∈ [t k+1 , t k+2 ) is equivalent to y (d) (t k+1 ) − y (d) (t k+1 ) = 0 |M| for ∀d ∈ N 0 , which is further equivalent to (40) by considering the solution (80).
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Without loss of generality, we let σ(ζ k ) = r ∈ T, and ζ k < t k+1 , k ∈ N, i.e., attacker "pauses" ZDA at ζ k . We now prove this theorem via a contradiction. Furthermore, we assume that the attack is not detectable over the interval [ζ − k , ξ k+1 ), which is equivalent to
where y (t) is defined in (68).
Considering the fact that given a differentiable function f (t), f (t) = 0 for any t ∈ [a, b], if and only if f (a) = 0 and f (d) (a) = 0, ∀d ∈ N. We conclude from (75) that (81) at time ζ k is equivalent to
With the definitions of A r , C, D and z (·) in (16b), (16c), (16e) and (33) , the relation (82) can be further rewritten under different forms of observation as follows:
• Full Observation of Velocity, i.e., c i1 = 0, ∀i ∈ M,
• Full Observation of Position, i.e., c i2 = 0, ∀i ∈ M,
• Partial Observation, i.e., c i1 = 0 and c i2 = 0, ∀i ∈ M,
Considering the definition of the vector z(t) in (33) , and its continuity with respect to time, i.e., z ζ − k = z (ζ k ), it follows from (35) and (23) 
which, in conjunction with the fact of e ηr(ζ − k −ξ k ) = 0 and the condition (26b), results in
With variablesg(ζ − k ),ḡ(ζ − k ), z (ζ k ), A r and P k defined in (16f), (16g), (33) , (16b) and (32) , respectively, expanding (87) yields
Before proceeding the rest of proof, we define the variables:
where U ri is given in (44) .
A. Under Full Observation
Let us start with full observation of velocity. It follows from (11) that L d r = Q r Λ d r Q ⊤ r with Λ r given by (11) . Thus, (83d) is equivalent to
with the consideration of the matrix C 2 defined in (16d) with c i2 = 0, ∀i ∈ M. Further, recalling H r , H i and U ri from (90c), (90a) and (44), from (91) we have
It can be verified from (90b)-(90d) that H r = H r D r , from which we have det H r = det (H r ) det (D r ). The matrix defined in (90b) shows if L r has distinct eigenvalues, D r is full-rank. In addition, by Lemma 5, the Vandermonde matrix H r is full-rank; thus, H r is full-rank. Therefore, the solution of (92) is
With the definitions in (44) We note that (44), (45) and (47) imply that ∃i ∈ M : diag [Q r ] i,2 , . . . , [Q r ] i,|V| is full-rank. Thus, from (94) we have Q ⊤ r 2:|V|,: x (ζ k ) = 0 |V|−1 . By Lemma 6, the solution of (94) is
Considering (83c), using the same method to derive (95), we obtain
Substituting (95) into (83b) yields C 2 v (ζ k ) = 0 |M| , which together with (96) results in
For the full observation of position, using nearly the same analysis method employed above, we obtain the same results as (95) and (97).
Substituting (95) and (97) into (89) yieldsḡ ζ − k = 0 |V| , and consequently,g ζ − k = 0 2|V| . This means that there is no ZDA on the system at ζ − k , which contradicts the assumption that the attack is applied until ζ k . Therefore, we conclude that under the full observation of position or velocity, the intermittent ZDA is detectable.
To proceed with the proof of (48), we first need to obtain ker(O k ) of the system (17) given in (22) . The analysis of the kernel of the observability matrix O k can follow the relation (82) with the setting of D = 0 |M|×2|V| . We note that (82) is equivalently represented by (83), (84) and (85). The results (95) and (96) are obtained without considering (83a), (84a) and (85a) which are the only terms involving D. Then, results similar to (95) and (96) can be obtained for the system in (17) as (20) and (21), we arrive at (48) . To obtain ker(O k ) under full observation of position, we can consider (84) with D = 0 |M|×2|V| . From (84a) and (95) we have x 1 (ζ k ) = . . . = x |V| (ζ k ) = 0. Then, we obtain from (97) (replace v i (ζ k ) by v i (ζ k )) that ker(O k ) = 0 2|V| , which means that if the monitored agents output full observation of positions, the system (17) is observable at t k ; thus (49) is obtained by computation of (20) and (21) .
B. Under Partial Observation
The analysis of observability follows the same steps of that under full observation. With C 1 = C 2 , from (85c) we have C 2 L d+1 r x(ζ k ) = 0, ∀d ∈ N 0 . Employing the same steps to derive (95) under full observation of velocity, we obtain (95) as well under partial observation. Moreover, substituting (95) into (85b) and repeating the same steps, we arrive at (96). It is straightforward to verify from the dynamics (17) that x 1 (t) = . . . = x |V| (t) and v 1 (t) = . . . = v |V| (t) for any t ≥ t 0 if and only if (96) and (95) hold. Finally, considering (85a) with the setting of D = 0 |M|×2|V| , we have
, ∀k ∈ N 0 , and then (50) is obtained by computation of (20) and (21) . Under the condition (51), z (ζ k ) ∈ N k 1 , which in conjunction with (88) implies η r = −1. Substituting (95), (96) and η r = −1 into (89) yieldsḡ ζ − k = 0 |V| , and consequently, g ζ − k = 0 2|V| . This means that there is no ZDA on the system at ζ − k , which contradicts the assumption that the attack is applied until ζ k .
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 2
With the definition of C j , j = 1, 2, in (16d), we can rewrite (79) aṡ
We define C diag c 12 , . . . , c |D|2 , where the diagonal entries are from C 2 defined in (16d). According to (52) and |D| ≤ |M| (implied by (43) ), the matrix C is invertible. Now, considering (42), we have
which, in conjunction with invertible matrix C and the definitions of A s in (16b) and A s in (37) , implies that if C 2 L s − L s x (d) (t k+1 ) = 0 |M| , ∀d ∈ N 0 , then
Under the dynamics (99) and the relation (101), the necessary condition (40) of guaranteeing stealthy property of cooperative ZDA is equivalently written as
We assume that the topology attack in system (36) can ensure that the stealthy property (5) of ZDA holds. Noticing (100) and the dynamics (17), the equation (102) is equivalent to CL σ(t k+1 ) χ (m) (t k+1 ) = 0 |D| , ∀m ∈ N 0 , where χ(t k+1 )
x 1 (t k+1 ) . . . x |D| (t k+1 ) ⊤ . Since C is invertible, we have L σ(t k+1 ) χ (m) (t k+1 ) = 0 |D| , ∀m ∈ N 0 .
As L σ(t k+1 ) is the elementary row transformation of a Laplacian matrix, there exists an elementary row operator E ∈ R |D|×|D| such that L σ(t k+1 ) EL σ(t k+1 ) is a Laplacian matrix. Premultiplying both sides of (103) by E yields L σ(t k+1 ) χ (m) (t k+1 ) = 0 |D| , ∀m ∈ N 0 .
It is well-known that the null space of the Laplacian matrix of a connected graph is spanned by the vector with all ones.
From (104) we conclude that ∃i, j ∈ D : x (m) i (t k+1 ) = x (m) j (t k+1 ), t k+1 ≥ t 0 , ∀m ∈ N 0 , which can be rewritten as e ⊤ i − e ⊤ j x (m) (t k+1 ) = 0, ∀m ∈ N 0 (105)
where e i denotes a vector of length |D| with a single nonzero entry with value 1 in its ith position. Due to the dynamics (17), the equation (105) leads to e ⊤ i − e ⊤ j L m r x (t k+1 ) = 0, ∀m ∈ N 0 (106a)
It follows from (11) that L d r = Q r Λ d r Q ⊤ r with Λ r given by (11) , substituting which into (106) yields that for ∀m ∈ N,
Then, with the definitions
following the same derivations from (91) to (92), we arrive at
where H r is given in (90c). Using the same analysis to derive (93), we conclude that under the condition (46) , the solution of (110) is D ij f = 0 |V|−1 . Since D ij given by (108) is full-rank under the condition (53), we have f = 0 |V|−1 . Then, noticing (109), by Lemma 6 we arrive at
Repeating the same procedure of deriving (111) from (107a), we conclude v 1 (t k+1 ) = . . . = v |V| (t k+1 ) from (107b), which means that the second-order consensus is achieved at t k+1 , i.e., x i (t k+1 ) = x j (t k+1 ) and v i (t k+1 ) = v j (t k+1 ), ∀i = j ∈ V. It is straightforward to verify from the dynamics (65) that the second-order consensus is achieved at some time t < ∞ if and only if the individual initial conditions are identical, i.e., x i (t 0 ) = x j (t 0 ) and v i (t 0 ) = v j (t 0 ). Hence, the cooperative ZDA is undetectable only in the case of identical initial condition.
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We define e x (t) q (t) −x (t) and e v (t) w (t) −v (t). The dynamics of tracking errors in the presence of the attack obtained from (54) and (14) are given as: 
The attack is not detected by the observer (54) means that r i (t) = 0, i ∈ M, for any t ≥ t 0 . Substituting it into the above equation results iṅ e xi (t) = e vi (t) e vi (t) = −e vi (t) + i∈V a σ(t) ij e xj (t) − e xi (t) − g i (t), i ∈ K 0, i ∈ V\K r i (t) = c i1 e xi (t) + c i2 e vi (t) − d igi (t) , i ∈ M which has the same form of dynamics as that of (14) . Therefore, the analysis of ZDA variations in the observer (54) follows the same analysis of the system (14) . Moreover, the required condition (52) implies that the monitored agents output full observations of velocity or partial observations: either (48) or (50) implies (19) . Hence, the topology attacker cannot infer the real-time full states of the non-monitored agents, and the topology attacker has to consider the scope of the target connections implied by (43) . Therefore, the proof of the first statement follows from Theorems 1 and 2.
In the absence of attacks, the system matrix of system (112) is A σ(t) defined in (55) . Since condition (46) implies that all of the switching topologies provided to Algorithm 1 are connected graphs and condition (52) implies (57), the matrix A σ(t) is Hurwitz by Lemma 3. Thus, there exists a P > 0 such that both (59) and (58) hold. Hence, the proof of the second statement follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 3.
